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YOU CANNOT EAT CRITIQUE:  
ON UNCRITICAL CRITICAL (LEGAL) THEORY AND  
THE POVERTY OF BULLSHIT 
Matthew Evans* † 
This article reflects upon critical theory, focusing especially on critical legal theory, 
particularly in relation to human rights. Positing that much critical theory is in fact 
uncritical, the article argues that critical theory is frequently deployed in such a way 
as to contradict its supposed purposes of challenging the prevailing order, orthodoxy 
and injustice, and guiding radical change. It is argued that in deploying critical (legal) 
theory there is a danger of producing bullshit, which scholars should be mindful of and 
should seek to avoid. Finally, the article suggests moving towards postdisciplinarity 
and to greater integration of critique with theory and practice as possible resolutions 
to the dilemmas and contradictions exposed by drawing attention to bullshit and 
uncritical critical (legal) theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Theory, it is said, is 'always for someone and for some purpose'.1 This invites 
the questions of who and what it is for. This article considers these questions, 
focusing on critical theory – particularly critical legal theory – and its 
deployment by scholars. Robert Cox contrasts 'critical' and 'problem-solving' 
theories.2 Critical theories are those which do not 'take institutions and social 
and power relations for granted'.3 Moreover, '[c]ritical theory allows for a 
normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the 
prevailing order', a 'principle objective' being to 'clarify [the] range of possible 
alternatives'.4 This is more or less congruent with the formulation proposed 
by the Critical Legal Thinking blog: critique is 'minimally' understood 'as the 
challenging of orthodoxy, ideology and systemic injustice' and is 'the 
companion and guide of radical change'.5 However, some – perhaps even much 
– of what is put forward as critical (legal) theory does not do what these 
formulations suggest it should. Indeed, '[c]ritique has not been critical 
enough in spite of all its sore-scratching'.6 
 
1 Robert W Cox, 'Social forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory' (1981) 10 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 126, 128. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid 129. 
4 Ibid 130. 
5 Critical Legal Thinking, 'Submissions' (Critical Legal Thinking) 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/Submissions/> accessed 12 June 2019; see also 
David Jabbari, 'From Criticism to Construction in Modern Critical Legal Theory' 
(1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 507, 507. 
6 Bruno Latour, 'Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern' (2004) 30 Critical Inquiry 225, 232. 
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Though it has been over four decades since the publication of EP 
Thompson's The Poverty of Theory,7 and over three since the first appearance 
of On Bullshit by Harry Frankfurt,8 both remain useful in thinking through 
the issues covered here. 'Bullshit', in Frankfurt's sense, is a form of dishonesty 
short of lying, where claims are deployed without regard for whether they are 
true or false.9 It includes that which 'lack[s] evidence' or is 'obscure, 
ambiguous, unnecessarily wordy or disorderly'.10 It is put forward 'to suit [the 
bullshitter's] purpose',11 rather than to further other goals, such as 
clarification or truth-seeking. Neil Stammers's notion of 'uncritical critics' of 
human rights (as compared to both 'critical' and 'uncritical proponents') is 
also useful for the purposes of this article, as is Dustin Sharp's recent work 
reflecting on bringing together critical theory and 'critically motivated 
problem-solving theory' in transitional justice.12 Indeed, there is an emphasis 
on critical theory and human rights throughout. These lenses of analysis are 
applied in the discussion which follows, arguing that too much of what passes 
for critical theory is both bullshit and deeply uncritical. 
This article is deliberately provocative. It is somewhat polemical – it is in part 
'a critical polemic against polemical critics'.13 The intention is to disrupt, to 
stimulate thought and – perhaps – action. Analysis, theorisation, and critique 
are things which are done purposively. They can, then, be done differently. 
Moreover, criticality does not inhere in an author. The same person (even the 
same piece) might produce both critical and uncritical critique. It is not 
 
7 EP Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (Merlin 1978). 
8 Harry G Frankfurt, 'On Bullshit' (1986) 6 Raritan Quarterly Review 81; Harry G 
Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton University Press 2005). 
9 Frankfurt, On Bullshit (n 8). 
10 Petter A Naessan, Book review of On Bullshit by Harry Frankfurt (2005) 53 
Philosophy Now <https://philosophynow.org/issues/53/On_Bullshit_by_Harry_ 
Frankfurt> accessed 24 July 2019. 
11 Frankfurt, On Bullshit (n 8) 56. 
12 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009) 8; Neil 
Stammers, 'Human Rights and Social Movements: Theoretical Perspectives' 
(2015) 75 Revue interdisciplinaire d'études juridiques 67; Dustin N Sharp, 'What 
Would Satisfy Us? Taking Stock of Critical Approaches to Transitional Justice' 
(2019) 13 International Journal of Transitional Justice 570. 
13 Anthony J Langlois, 'Human Rights in Crisis? A Critical Polemic Against 
Polemical Critics' (2012) 11 Journal of Human Rights 558. 
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suggested that all critical theory suffers from the problems identified here, or 
that these issues apply equally and in the same way to all critical theory or its 
application. Critical theory is far from homogenous.14 
The intention here is therefore not to provide an overview of or response to 
the entire oeuvre of critical (legal) theory – this would be far outside the scope 
of an article such as this. Moreover, the works discussed in this piece are not 
chosen with a view to them being representative of critical (legal) theory as a 
whole. Rather, the article focuses on some particular tendencies evident in 
some, but not all, critical (legal) theory. The works of critical theory discussed 
here are chosen as illustrative examples which highlight potentially uncritical 
tendencies and – especially – dilemmas and implications which emerge from 
them. The empirical examples of activism and practice are likewise not 
representative of all possible applications of the issues discussed in the 
article. They are instead used to illustrate and illuminate some of the practical 
implications of the more theoretical discussion in the article. 
The following analysis is interpretative and exploratory. Furthermore, the 
provocation – or invitation – of this article is as much self-reflexive and self-
directed as it is outward-facing. It is not written from a position outside of 
the phenomena it discusses. Following John Holloway, it is an attempt, no 
doubt flawed and partial, to think and act 'in, against, and beyond'15 critical 
(legal) theory. In doing so the article also seeks to move beyond disciplinary 
perspectives. It is not concerned only with critical legal theory. Thinking 
across and beyond disciplines is necessary to make the arguments put forward 
here, which draw on multiple areas outside law and legal theory, as well as 
interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and postdisciplinarity.16 This focus is 
 
14 Ben Golder, 'Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique of Human 
Rights in Contemporary International Legal Thought' (2014) 2 London Review 
of International Law 77. 
15 John Holloway, In, Against, and Beyond Capitalism: The San Francisco Lectures (PM 
Press 2016). 
16 Raymond C Miller, 'Interdisciplinarity: Its Meaning and Consequences' Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (20 November 2017). DOI: 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.92; Andrew Sayer, 'Long Live 
Postdisciplinary Studies! Sociology and the Curse of Disciplinary 
Parochialism/Imperialism'. Paper presented to the British Sociological 
Association Conference, Glasgow, April 1999, published by the Department of 
2021} You Cannot Eat Critique 191 
  
in part motivated by the experience of having studied and taught multiple 
disciplines and of being, by a quirk of circumstance, based in a law school 
without having trained as a practising or academic lawyer. 
The article argues that too often in critical theory orthodoxies are reinforced 
rather than challenged, the possibilities for radical change are obscured and 
the prevailing order reinforced. Too much critical theory is, in a sense, 
uncritical. In the sections that follow, each of these interrelated trends are 
explored. In the final substantive section, some possible approaches to 
resolving the dilemmas and contradictions the article sets out are offered, 
before conclusions are put forward. These relate to the possibility of moving 
beyond disciplinary divides – towards postdisciplinarity – in order to make 
use of the most appropriate intellectual tools and avoid disciplinary 
parochialism and imperialism. In this way, the article points towards the 
possibility of integrating critique with theory and practice in order to avoid 
utopianism and better identify where and how change might be achieved.17 
II. REINFORCING ORTHODOXIES 
For all that critical (legal) theory affects towards challenging orthodoxies, it 
nevertheless contains orthodoxies and (small-c) conservative tendencies.18 A 
 
Sociology, Lancaster University. <https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/resources/ 
sociology-online-papers/papers/sayer-long-live-postdisciplinary-studies.pdf> 
accessed 22 May 2019; Andrew Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary Studies: Sociology and 
the Curse of Disciplinary Parochialism/Imperialism' in John Eldridge, John 
Maclnnes, Sue Scott, Chris Warhurst and Anne Witz (eds) For Sociology: Legacies 
and Prospects (Sociologypress 2000); Justin Rosenberg, 'International Relations — 
The "Higher Bullshit": A Reply to the Globalization Theory Debate' (2007) 44 
International Politics 450. 
17 See Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary 
Studies' (n 16); Sharp (n 12); Ron Dudai, 'The Study of Human Rights Practice: 
State of the Art' (2019) 11 Journal of Human Rights Practice 273. 
18 Matt McManus, 'On Critical Legal Studies and the Limits of Critique' (Merion 
West, 29 September 2018) <https://merionwest.com/2018/09/29/on-critical-
legal-studies-and-the-limits-of-critique/> accessed 3 July 2019; Costas Douzinas 
and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Hart 
2005) 247; Costas Douzinas, Peter Goodrich and Yifat Hachamovitch, 
'Introduction: Politics, Ethics and the Legality of the Contingent' in Costas 
Douzinas, Peter Goodrich and Yifat Hachamovitch (eds), Politics, Postmodernity 
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small number of theorists and approaches have become canonised and, at 
times, placed almost beyond reproach.19 Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall and 
Costas Douzinas, for instance, argue that they do not 'identify, categorise and 
worship a [critical (legal) theory] canon'.20 Nevertheless, in their words, 'it 
should come as no surprise' that a group of particularly influential theorists 
are easily identifiable.21 Michel Foucault is chief among these.22 To be blunt, 
Foucault is overrated.23 This does not mean that nothing about his body of 
work is ever useful – frequently it is – but the degree of attention paid to 
Foucault is massively disproportionate to his actual contributions.24 As Lara 
Montesinos Coleman notes, regardless of his contributions, 'Foucault's 
critical ethos can be neither starting point nor end of engagement with 
 
and Critical Legal Studies: The Legality of the Contingent (Routledge, 1994) 13-14; 
Jasmine Chorley, Rob Hunter, Dimitrios Kivotidis, Eva Nanopoulos, Paul 
O'Connell and Umut Özsu, 'About' (Legal Form: A Forum for Marxist Analysis 
of Law, October 2017) <https://legalform.blog/About/> accessed 29 August 2019. 
19 Dylan Riley, 'Bourdieu's Class Theory: The Academic as Revolutionary' (2017) 1 
Catalyst 107; Daniel Zamora, 'Can We Criticize Foucault?' Jacobin (10 December 
2014) <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/12/foucault-interview/> accessed 17 
June 2019; Daniel Zamora, 'Introduction: Foucault, the Left, and the 1980s'. In 
Michael C Behrent and Daniel Zamora (eds), Foucault and Neoliberalism, Ebook 
Edition (Polity Press 2016); Chorley and others (n 18). 
20 Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall and Costas Douzinas, 'Introduction: Law, Politics 
and the Political' in Matthew Stone, lllan rua Wall and Costas Douzinas (eds), 
New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the Political (Birkbeck Law Press 2012) 7. 
21 Ibid 4; also Douzinas and Gearey (n 18) 242. 
22 See also Zamora, 'Can We Criticize Foucault?' (n 19); Zamora, 'Introduction' (n 
19); Riley (n 19) 107. 
23 Karlene Faith, Book Review of Up against Foucault: Explorations of Some 
Tensions between Foucault and Feminism edited by Caroline Ramazanoğlu 
(1995) 23 Crime, Law and Social Change 257. Susan Bordo, 'Feminism, Foucault 
and the Politics of the Body' in Caroline Ramazanoğlu (ed), Up against Foucault: 
Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism (Routledge, 1993); 
Michael C Behrent, 'Conclusion: The Strange Failure (and Peculiar Success) of 
Foucault's Project' in Michael C Behrent and Daniel Zamora (eds), Foucault and 
Neoliberalism (Polity Press 2016). 
24 Faith (n 23) 257-258. Of course, this article further contributes to this attention. 
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actually existing struggles'.25 Moreover, whilst 'not all academics who love 
Foucault are neoliberals[,] the neoliberal academy, thought of as a "diffuse 
network of power relations", certainly loves Foucault'.26 Indeed, a 'Foucault 
industrial complex' has developed in and around academia.27 One possible 
reason for this is the degree to which it is possible for scholars deploying 
Foucault to say whatever they please and see themselves reflected back in 
Foucault, who was notoriously reluctant to give unambiguous, authoritative 
interpretations of his own work.28 Indeed, he said 'I prefer not to identify 
myself, and I'm amused by the diversity of the ways I've been judged and 
classified'.29 
Some might view multiple – and potentially contradictory – possible 
interpretations as a strength. Foucault himself seemed to. Noting that he has  
been situated in most of the squares on the political checkerboard, one after 
another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or 
disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the 





25 Lara Montesinos Coleman, 'Ethnography, Commitment, and Critique: 
Departing from Activist Scholarship' (2015) 9 International Political Sociology 
263, 263. 
26 Progressive Geographies, Comment on 'Foucault and Neoliberalism – A few 
Thoughts in Response to the Zamora Piece in Jacobin' by Stuart Elden, posted by 
the user wobblywheel at 8:55pm (Progressive Geographies, 31 December 2014) 
<https://progressivegeographies.com/2014/12/17/foucault-and-neoliberalism-a-
few-thoughts-in-response-to-the-zamora-piece-in-jacobin/#comment-72160> 
accessed 17 June 2019. 
27 This term comes from comments made by Paul McGuinness on 3 October 2018 
at the Critical Theory Reading Group, Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, 
Brighton. 
28 Zamora, 'Introduction' (n 19). 
29 Michel Foucault, 'Polemics, Politics and Problematizations: An Interview 
Conducted by Paul Rabinow in May 1984' 
<https://foucault.info/documents/foucault.interview/> accessed 22 July 2019. 
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Foucault posited that  
[n]one of these descriptions is important by itself; taken together, on the 
other hand, they mean something. And I must admit that I rather like what 
they mean.30  
This diversity of possible interpretations is, however, also a weakness.31 There 
is a danger that Foucauldian critique could mean almost anything, and thus 
that it could be reduced to the bullshit Frankfurt wrote against.32 
As noted above, utterances which 'lack evidence' or which 'are obscure, 
ambiguous, unnecessarily wordy or disorderly' could be bullshit.33 The 
bullshitter has no regard for whether their claims are true or false.34 Rather, 
they are concerned with 'trying to get away with something'35 – picking out or 
making up claims 'to suit [the bullshitter's] purpose', whatever that may be at 
the time.36 It is entirely possible for Foucauldian critique to contain bullshit, 
particularly if it claims to be more authentic, or more authoritative, than 
alternative interpretations.37 This does not mean that Foucault was a 
bullshitter, but Foucauldian bullshit is not difficult to produce. Bruno Latour 
makes a somewhat similar – but more general – point, arguing that 'critique 
[…] has become such a potent euphoric drug' because, as a critic: 
 
30 Ibid. 
31 Zamora, 'Introduction' (n 19). See also, more generally, Steven Knapp and Walter 
Benn Michaels, 'Against Theory' in Vincent B Leitch, William E Cain, Laurie 
Finke, Barbara Johnson, John McGowan and Jeffrey J Williams (eds), The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism (WW Norton 2001). 
32 Frankfurt, On Bullshit (n 8). 
33 Naessan (n 10). 
34 Frankfurt, On Bullshit (n 8). 
35 Ibid 23. 
36 Ibid 56. There may be circumstances where such bullshitting is expected or 
necessary (perhaps even desirable). One such instance might be in the roles of 
lawyers in adversarial systems, with each side required to pick out and interpret 
evidence in order to put forward the best position for their clients, rather than to 
provide the fullest or most accurate account of events (thanks must go to Lindsay 
Stirton for raising this point). A key claim of this article, however, is that bullshit 
is unnecessary, undesirable and ought to be avoided in critical theorising. 
37 See Behrent (n 23). 
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[y]ou are always right! When naïve believers are clinging forcefully to their 
objects, claiming that they are made to do things because of their gods, their 
poetry, their cherished objects, you can turn all of those attachments into so 
many fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing that it is nothing but 
their own projection, that you, yes you alone, can see. But as soon as naïve 
believers are thus inflated by some belief in their own importance, in their 
own projective capacity, you strike them by a second uppercut and humiliate 
them again, this time by showing that, whatever they think, their behavior is 
entirely determined by the action of powerful causalities coming from 
objective reality they don't see, but that you, yes you, the never sleeping 
critic, alone can see.38 
The canonisation of certain critical theorists – particularly Foucault – is 
further evident in the fact that Jacobin headlined a piece 'Can We Criticize 
Foucault?'.39 Foucault scholars were quick to maintain that Foucault can be 
and has been criticised.40 Nevertheless, there is a danger here. In Michael 
Behrent’s words, this  
consists in turning Foucault into [a] fantasy philosopher, the thinker 
[readers] want him to be — an unrelenting critic of Marxism who somehow 
remained a kind of socialist; a Nietzschean who embraced solid progressive 
principles. This is just wishful thinking.41 
 
38 Latour (n 6) 238-239. Latour's work can itself be criticised along similar lines, 
including that it offers 'incoherence disguised as [complexity]' (perhaps 
comprising bullshit in Frankfurt's terms) and (contrary to the supposed ends of 
critical theory) that it 'conceals an agenda that is not only uncritical but deeply 
politically conservative'. Indeed, RH Lossin suggests that '[i]f neoliberalism were 
a Platonic Republic, Bruno Latour would likely be its philosopher-king'. See 
Rebecca H Lossin, 'Neoliberalism for Polite Company: Bruno Latour's Pseudo-
Materialist Coup' Salvage (1 June 2020) <https://salvage.zone/articles/ 
neoliberalism-for-polite-company-bruno-latours-pseudo-materialist-coup/> 
accessed 3 June 2020. 
39 Zamora, 'Can We Criticize Foucault?' (n 19). 
40 Stuart Elden, 'Foucault and Neoliberalism – A Few Thoughts in Response to the 
Zamora Piece in Jacobin' (Progressive Geographies, 17 December 2014) 
<https://progressivegeographies.com/2014/12/17/foucault-and-neoliberalism-a-
few-thoughts-in-response-to-the-zamora-piece-in-jacobin/> accessed 17 June 
2019. 
41 Michael Behrent, Comment on 'Foucault and Neoliberalism – a few thoughts in 
response to the Zamora piece in Jacobin' by Stuart Elden, posted at 5:50am 
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Similar criticisms have been raised over the popularity of other theorists. 
Dylan Riley focuses on Pierre Bourdieu, 'whose enormous contemporary 
influence is only comparable to that previously enjoyed by Sartre or 
Foucault'.42 Riley argues that in US academia the popularity of Bourdieu's 
critical theory 'is due neither to its explanatory power nor to its ability to 
generate new problems and questions'.43 Rather, Bourdieu 'resonates with 
the lived experience of elite academics, offers a form of ersatz radicalism 
focused on self-transformation, and provides the sociologist' – or, indeed, 
other disciplinary scholar – 'with a sense of having an elevated social role'.44 
Thompson, arguing against Louis Althusser, posits that such critical theory 
allows scholars 'to perform imaginary revolutionary psycho-dramas […] while 
in fact falling back upon a very old tradition of bourgeois elitism for which 
Althusserian theory is exactly tailored'.45 Phil Burton-Cartledge is more 
charitable to Althusser than Thompson, but the danger of Althusserian 
bullshit is also evident in his reading. Burton-Cartledge notes, for instance, 
that Althusser's For Marx 'ruthlessly attacks woolly thinking while, ironically, 
exhibiting some itself'.46 
In these scenarios, critical theory seems to be more for reassuring academics 
of their own importance and for maintaining their status and position in 
society, rather than for challenging orthodoxy.47 Indeed, in canonising 
particular approaches, new orthodoxies can be created.48 Furthermore, as 
 
(Progressive Geographies, 21 December 2014) <https://progressivegeographies. 
com/2014/12/17/foucault-and-neoliberalism-a-few-thoughts-in-response-to-the-
zamora-piece-in-jacobin/#comment-69426> accessed 17 June 2019; see also 
Behrent (n 23). 
42 Riley (n 19) 107. 
43 Riley (n 19) 136. 
44 Ibid. Lossins (n 38), similarly, argues that Latour's 'academic popularity is both 
understandable and disturbing' given he 'has, over several decades, elaborated a 
grand system of thought that is seductively materialist in appearance, and deeply 
reactionary in substance'. 
45 Thompson (n 7) 3. 
46 Phil Burton-Cartledge, 'Five Books on Marx and Marxism' (All That Is Solid…, 6 
May 2013) <http://averypublicsociologist.blogspot.com/2013/05/five-books-on-
marx-and-marxism.html> accessed 14 August 2019. 
47 See Riley (n 19); Latour (n 6) 239; Sharp (n 12); Lossins (n 38). 
48 Dudai (n 17); Chorley and others (n 18). 
2021} You Cannot Eat Critique 197 
  
discussed further below in relation to critical theory reinforcing the 
prevailing order, maintaining distinct divides between disciplines reinforces 
orthodoxies within academia. Critical legal theory's place within law as a 
discipline, for example, reinforces the idea that the study of law ought to be 
treated as distinct from (and in some approaches, more important than) the 
study of other phenomena.49 
III. OBSCURING POSSIBILITIES FOR RADICAL CHANGE 
There is often a theory-practice divide.50 Whilst some insist critique is 
practice or theory is practice,51 this is only true to an extent.52 Radical change 
rarely emanates from professionalised intellectual spaces. Social movements, 
of course, have their own organic intellectuals.53 Much of the time, however, 
for the organic intellectuals of social movements engaged in on-the-ground 
struggle it is difficult to see what it matters what Foucault said to Sartre on a 
wet Wednesday in 1979.54 Indeed, what was said might not even have been 
very interesting to those concerned with the political debates in which they 
 
49 Miller (n 16). Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For 
Postdisciplinary Studies' (n 16); Dudai (n 17). 
50 Thompson (n 7) 3; Dudai (n 17). 
51 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews 
(Donald F Bouchard and Sherry Simon trs, Cornell University Press 1977) 208; 
Larry Shiner, 'Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-
Knowledge' (1982) 21 History and Theory 382, 383. 
52 Faith (n 23); Conor Gearty, 'Human Rights Research Beyond the Traditional 
Paradigm: Afterword' in Damian Gonzalez-Salzberg and Loveday Hodson (eds), 
Research Methods for International Human Rights Law: Beyond the traditional 
paradigm (Routledge 2019). 
53 David Forgacs (ed), The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935 (New York 
University Press 2000) 300-311; also Corinne Lennox and Yeşim Yaprak Yıldız, 
'Activist Scholarship in Human Rights' (2020) 24 International Journal of Human 
Rights 4; Coleman (n 25). 
54 Arthur Scargill, former president of the National Union of Mineworkers, 
dismissed critics associated with small Marxist groupings with the derisive 
question 'What does it matter what Trotsky said to Lenin on a wet Wednesday 
in 1917?'. See Simon Harvey, 'Arthur Scargill and the End of a Fantasy' (Miner's 
Advice) <https://www.minersadvice.co.uk/yourview21_scargill_fantasy.htm> 
accessed 17 June 2019; for Scargill using a similar turn of phrase see Arthur Scargill, 
'The New Unionism' (1975) 92 New Left Review 3, 12. 
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were intervening.55 It might, in fact, have been bullshit. Edward Said, for 
example, was disappointed with both Sartre and Foucault's (lack of) 
intellectual and political engagement on Palestine.56 
Likewise, Riley explains Bourdieu's popularity as, in part, 'growing out of the 
separation of intellectuals from mass political movements'.57 Thompson 
makes a similar criticism of Althusserian theorists who 'would like to be 
"revolutionaries"' but are  
the products of a particular 'conjuncture' which has broken the circuits 
between intellectuality and practical experience (both in real political 
movements, and in the actual segregation imposed by contemporary 
institutional structures).58  
Indeed, '[w]hen academics cannot talk to anyone except one another, and 
even then with difficulty, there can be no political weight to their 
theorizing'.59 When this occurs, critical theory is neither companion nor 
guide to radical change.60 
Furthermore, as Conor Gearty notes, critical legal theorising may be of 
limited practical use to those who are, for example, attempting to persuade 
actually existing courts to protect a vulnerable or targeted group.61 What 
those engaged in the realities of practice – influenced and compromised by 
manifestations of power and politics – can meaningfully take from the 
(possible) insights of critique is an open question which ought to be engaged 
with.62 Responding to Martti Koskenniemi's critical theoretical approach to 
 
55 Langlois (n 13); Coleman (n 25). 
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58 Thompson (n 7) 3. 
59 Faith (n 23) 267; also Richard Michael Fischl, 'The Question That Killed Critical 
Legal Studies' (1992) 17 Law and Social Inquiry 779, 804-805; Langlois (n 13). 
60 Critical Legal Thinking (n 5). 
61 Gearty (n 52). See also Isobel Roele, 'Policing Critique' (2018) 81 Modern Law 
Review 701, 711. 
62 Dudai (n 17); Lennox and Yıldız (n 53); Coleman (n 25); Lara Montesinos Coleman, 
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36 Third World Quarterly 1060. 
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international law, and his preferred form of critical international law 
professional, Isobel Roele, for instance, ponders '[w]ho is this individual who 
exercises professional judgment in a way that resists power and is driven by 
emotional instinct?'. She argues that 'Koskenniemi swathes [the ideal critical 
professional] in so many gauzy layers of misdirection that they escape our 
intellectual grasp'.63 Koskenniemi argues that  
critical law is perhaps not reducible to abstract discourses, methods or 
'principles' but identified by a gut feeling about the way the injustice of the 
world is a product of its ruling symbolic order and therefore cannot be treated 
through it.64 
However, Roele responds that 'Koskenniemi gestures his intentions and 
avoids packaging this idea in easily abstractable language. His ideas are 
revealed obscurely – carefully coded messages to like-minded lawyers'.65 In 
this approach, there is a danger of Koskenniemi's ideas taking the form of 
bullshit. According to Roele, Koskenniemi  
not even naming his politically-engaged, emotionally-aware moral agent of 
an international lawyer undermines the critically transformative power of 
the idea. This anonymous aspiration is hope incognito, a figure that will only 
be recognised by those already in-the-know.66 
One does not have to be in the business of writing 'recipes […] for the cook-
shops of the future'67 to be troubled by demobilising and demotivating 
implications of some critical legal theory. This is particularly the case in the 
strand of critical legal theory which tends towards 'trashing' – including of 
arguably (or, at least, potentially) progressive tendencies such as human rights 
– to the exclusion of 'putting forward constructive moral arguments'.68 Some 
 
63 Roele (n 61) 712. 
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of these critiques (whether framed as 'trashing' or not) are uncritical in that 
they are empirically questionable, constructing then defeating straw-men. 
For example, the critiques raised by David Kennedy in the influential piece 
'The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?' are by 
his own admission 'assertions, worries, polemical charges' and 'none of them 
has been proven'.69 
Raising, thinking through and responding to these kinds of concerns can be 
a useful exercise. More critical advocacy might emerge from the invitation to 
human rights advocates to consider questions like Kennedy's. For example, 
asking whether alternative – possibly more effective – vocabularies are 
crowded out by human rights framing, thinking through what is obscured or 
lost in focusing too much on the law and legal methods of advocacy, or 
problematising the – overly rigid – categories, roles and binary distinctions 
(victim/perpetrator, rights-holder/duty-bearer, refugee/citizen, and so on) 
which mainstream human rights advocacy can rely upon. However, as 
Kennedy himself notes, raising a concern does not prove its veracity, nor does 
it necessarily undermine the soundness of possible responses. Likewise, the 
raising of such concerns does not in itself help in the identification or pursuit 
of opportunities for radical change. 
For Stammers, 'uncritical critics take evidence of the abuse of 
institutionalised human rights as conclusive proof that human rights can only 
ever serve the interests of power'.70 At its most egregious, this kind of 
uncritical critique – being 'gloriously unencumbered by any perceived need 
 
'Critiques of Human Rights' (2018) 14 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
69; Lennox and Yıldız (n 53); Coleman (n 62); Mark Heywood, 'South Africa's 
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Socialist' (2019) 11 Journal of Human Rights Practice 305. 
69 David Kennedy, 'The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?' (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 101, 101. For a direct response 
to Kennedy's arguments see Hilary Charlesworth, 'Author! Author!: A Response 
to David Kennedy' (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 127. For further 
discussion of this in relation to human rights see Paul Gready, 'The Politics of 
Human Rights' (2003) 24 Third World Quarterly 745; Stammers, Human Rights 
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12) 76. 
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for supporting evidence'71 – is bullshit. This is not to deny that 'norms – 
including human rights norms – are open-ended, amenable to contrasting 
interpretations and to the support of contradictory agendas' including both 
institutionalisation in the interests of power, and, more progressively, 
mobilisation as 'struggle concepts' in challenges to power posited by social 
movements.72 Similar lessons can be taken from Samuel Moyn's position that 
human rights are neither a panacea nor inherently neoliberal or anti-
egalitarian.73 Indeed, using Stammers's terms, both the uncritical advocates 
and uncritical critics (who might claim human rights norms as monolithically 
positive or negative) ought to be opposed.74 
Costas Douzinas has argued that '[m]ost critics of rights belong today to the 
political left'.75 Even if this was true at the time of his writing, which is 
doubtful,76 it is difficult to make the case that this remains so, at least in the 
Global North.77 It is more plausible that most academic critics of rights come 
from the political or, at least, academic left.78 One might also posit a 
difference between (academic) critics of rights and (political) opponents of 
 
71 Gready (n 69) 747. 
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rights,79 in which case Douzinas's claim might better fit the evidence. 
Douzinas does not, however, explore such a distinction.80 
One might reasonably agree with Foucault that everything – including human 
rights – is not bad but dangerous, but so what?81 What does this tell anyone 
about understanding and responding to the world, including, for example, 
how they might attempt to address injustice? For example, the Foucauldian 
notion of dangerousness can be applied reflectively by both activists and 
scholars. Inviting them to consider the worst possible outcomes of their 
(dangerous) actions might lead to urging caution over naïve optimism. 
Causing harm – even endangering lives – through taking or supporting unduly 
confident and hopeful actions might then be avoided. However, part of the 
problem of this kind of critique is the idea that, in applying Foucauldian 
dangerousness, activists or scholars could be certain that they are taking the 
best action. There is the risk of a question-begging circularity in such an 
approach. Any bad outcome can be put down to a lack of caution or a failure 
to engage with dangerousness in what must therefore have been naïvely 
hopeful (perhaps insufficiently Foucauldian) approaches. On the other hand, 
any success can be marshalled as evidence that this must have been the best 
action, applying the correct degree of caution and awareness of 
dangerousness. 
Similarly, applying a Foucauldian lens of analysis to human rights, Pheng 
Cheah makes a series of elisions, each of which might be questioned. Cheah 
argues that the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 'became 
inseparable from policies of human development'. Moreover, '[h]uman 
development is the humanization of economic development', therefore 
the humanity that is produced can also be deployed by states in their 
strategies for increasing their resources, thereby compromising and marring 
the human face of development. 
 
Cheah posits that 
 
79 See Lennox and Yıldız (n 53); Coleman (n 62). 
80 Douzinas (n 75). See also Langlois (n 13) for discussion of Douzinas's positions. 
81 Michel Foucault, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in 
Progress'. In Paul Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader (Pantheon Books 1984) 343. 
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[t]he problem of implementing second- and third-generation human rights 
would need to be reconsidered from the ground up […] in terms of the very 
structure of biopolitical rights [and] in terms of the inscription of these 
rights in a biopolitical field that is always shifting.82  
However, what this would actually entail or how it might be done remains 
unclear. 
The view from the critical (legal) theoretical high ground may be clear, but 
what of stepping into the 'swamp' of practice?83 Pointing out the muddiness 
of the swamp does not in itself assist those who must traverse it to navigate a 
passable route. To paraphrase a question posed by an attendee at the 2015 
Critical Legal Conference (CLC) during an informal conversation: 
Foucauldian critique is all well and good, but what are you going to do about these 
refugees? It is true that you cannot eat rights84 – but then, you cannot eat 
critique either. 
At its worst, critical legal theory leads to a kind of nihilism,85 or 'fatalistic 
despair'.86 Things are bad (or dangerous), attempts to improve them are also 
bad (or dangerous) – as they are complicit in keeping things bad or making 
them differently bad (or dangerous) – so there is no point pursuing change.87 
Foucault claimed his position led 'not to apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism'.88 However, according to Karlene Faith, it is also the 
case that '[r]eading history through Foucault, the ultimate horror is that, 
 
82 See Pheng Cheah, 'Second-Generation Rights as Biopolitical Rights'. In Costas 
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because power comes from everywhere, no one can be held responsible for 
power abuses'.89 Indeed, Foucault's actions reflect this fatalism: despite 
'continu[ing] to sign petitions throughout th[e] period' after 'his "two years" 
service' of more directly engaged activism in the 1970s,90 Foucault argued 
that 'signing nothing or signing everything, either way, it amounts to the 
same'.91 
Of course, 'knowing that something is broken is not the same thing as 
knowing how to fix it'.92 Importantly, however, 'while it can deliver 
important insights, "relentless critique" alone will often prove insufficient to 
create a bridge between understanding and actual change in the world'.93 
Anthony J Langlois raises a similar issue: 
some of those on the contemporary critical left […] appear at times to leave 
the crushed of the world behind as they apparently conclude that the aporias 
of human rights (and political action more generally) preclude the possibility 
of (legitimately) doing anything for and/or with those in need.94 
Langlois suggests that '[t]his discourse may leave one in raptures about such 
prospective revelations as a "new cosmopolitanism to come" [drawing on 
Douzinas]', though 'it will not, however, facilitate cosmopolitan justice for 
those who seek it today'.95 
This is worth considering in relation to concrete instances of, and critical 
responses to, human rights advocacy. For instance, regarding responses to the 
(deeply flawed) Kony 2012 video and advocacy campaign, Lars Waldorf notes 
that '[t]here's no question that Kony 2012 smacks of missionary zeal and 
traffics in some tired tropes about Africa' but suggests that in responding to 
the campaign (and criticism of it) 'we should be less worried about the white 
man's burden and more worried about his indifference'.96 He argues, citing 
 
89 Faith (n 23) 264. 
90 Stuart Elden, Foucault: The Birth of Power (Polity Press 2017) 188. 
91 Cited in ibid 188. 
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94 Langlois (n 13) 560. 
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96 Lars Waldorf, 'White Noise: Hearing the Disaster' (2012) 4 Journal of Human 
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Irene Bruna Seu,97 that many criticisms of Kony 2012 utilise the same 
'repertoires of denial' which 'enable [audiences] to morally justify their 
passivity' in response to Amnesty International's human rights appeals.98 
These are 'the medium is the message', which 'focuses on the attributed 
manipulative function of the appeal', 'shoot the messenger', which 'attacks 
the sender of the appeal', and 'babies and bathwater', which 'questions in 
various ways the validity of the action recommended in the appeal'.99  
Waldorf argues that this 'risks reinforcing the public's sceptical consumerism 
towards human rights appeals as well as their moral apathy towards distant 
suffering'.100 The same risks, and some of the same 'repertoires of denial' – 
especially 'babies and bathwater' – are evident in uncritical criticism of 
human rights more broadly,101 as well as of other (no doubt highly imperfect) 
 
criticised by a number of other commentators, including Mahmood Mamdani. 
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'counterinsurgency' are deprioritised, simultaneously, 'the LRA is given as the 
reason why there must be a constant military mobilization, at first in northern 
Uganda, and [then] in the entire region' and 'why the US must sen[d] soldiers and 
weaponry, including drones, to the region'. Mahmood Mamdani, 'The Downside 
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mobilisations, such as Extinction Rebellion.102 The possibility of change, 
radical or otherwise, is therefore obscured, or reduced, as attempts to pursue 
it – flawed though they may be – are dismissed outright, along with the 
overarching causes they promote.103 
In these cases, the critical (legal) theorist occupies a position curiously 
reflecting the comic strip character Mister Gotcha, declaring 'I am very 
intelligent' whilst chastising those seeking to 'improve society somewhat' for 
nevertheless – supposedly hypocritically – 'participat[ing] in society'.104 
Whilst the comic satirises right-wing talking points, there is a real risk that 
critical (legal) theory – typically seen as a project of the academic, if not 
political, left105 – absorbs these and reproduces them in barely-altered form. 
Whilst perhaps not advancing the view that the prevailing order need not be 
changed, such critical (legal) theory nevertheless undermines attempts to 
achieve change by suggesting they are hopelessly naïve, or necessarily 
complicit in maintaining the systems to which they are opposed.106 This kind 
of critique invites responses similar in sentiment to those expressed by Ian 
MacKaye of the hardcore punk band Minor Threat in the song 'In My Eyes': 
'You tell me that I make no difference / Well at least I'm fucking trying / 
What the fuck have you done?'.107 The demand is not civil, to be sure, but it 
bears consideration:108 if the goal of critical (legal) theory is radical change, 
what does it actually do to further this? Is it even trying? 
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None of this is to suggest that good intentions are enough. Nor that trying to 
achieve positive change provides immunisation against, or absolution for, 
actually doing harm. Trying is, however, necessary for the pursuit of radical 
change, even if it is very far from sufficient. This is where questions emerge 
for producers and users of critical (legal) theory. Consistently, a question for 
those seeking radical change is how to pursue it – through what actions or 
politics? If critical theory lives up to its claims it ought to provide some 
guidance in this regard. This came to the forefront in recently attending a 
critical theory reading group, held in a law school, discussing Stuart Elden's 
Foucault: The Birth of Power.109 Participants frequently raised questions about 
what a Foucauldian politics, or Foucauldian activism, would actually be and 
what it might mean. Answers were not clear or consistent. Moreover, such a 
politics, if it can be discerned, need not be good, progressive or effective.110  
These questions, as well as those drawn from Cox highlighted above,111 pose 
problems for critical legal theory, especially that which builds upon Foucault: 
who and what is this for, and what are the implications of its application? In 
answering these, too often critical legal theory falls short, the apparent – or, 
at least, plausible – implication being that radical change is not possible. 
Jessica Whyte, for instance, attempts to unpick the meaning and 
implications of Foucault's – on the face of it potentially contradictory – 
positions on human rights. In doing so, rather than providing clarity over 
whether and how change might be pursued with and through Foucauldian 
thought, Whyte offers more limited conclusions: that 'Foucault's willingness 
to look for the domination masked by discourses of right and warning that we 
should beware of introducing a new hegemonic thought under the guise of 
human rights seem more important than ever'.112 
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In contrast to uncritical critics,113 Ron Dudai advocates a 'human rights 
practice perspective' as 'adopt[ing] a more complex position than either a 
triumphalist account or dead-end criticism'.114 Richard Seymour, meanwhile, 
concludes that it is possible to be critical of movements such as Extinction 
Rebellion, due to them being 'hippy-moralists who appear to have a 
simpleminded and depoliticised conception of "power" and "the system"' 
whilst, nevertheless, extending 'full solidarity to the hippy-moralists'.115 Mark 
Heywood, somewhat similarly, argues that in responding to the global 
political conjuncture (including inequality, violence, reactionary populism 
and looming environmental catastrophe), 'what is needed is not point-scoring 
but ideas' – including, but not limited to, those emerging from the human 
rights movements cast aside by 'the prevailing rights-sceptics' of (uncritical) 
critical scholarship.116 
In thinking beyond both uncritical advocacy and uncritical criticism of 
human rights, it is also worth considering the existing and potential roles of 
translation and vernacularisation in the ways human rights are locally 
understood and applied.117 Consideration should also be given to the scope 
for, and limitations of, activists' and affected communities' tactical use of the 
law – including legal human rights mechanisms – as well as to alternative 
tactics and alternative frameworks of understanding (although such 
alternatives are not always framed as based on critical legal theory).118 
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Uncritical critique on the other hand, lacking nuanced engagement with 
actually existing conditions and attempts to change them, too often obscures 
or denies the possibility for radical change. This, in turn, can serve to 
reinforce the prevailing order. 
IV. REINFORCING THE PREVAILING ORDER 
The prevailing order does not only comprise economic and social structures, 
states and governments. It is also reflected in and reinforced by institutions 
such as the university, and behaviours within them.119 The disciplining of the 
university is part of this.120 Just as 'juridification as an imperial process of 
colonising other disciplinary structures and spheres with specifically legal 
modes of thought has been widely noted in legal and political theory',121 so too 
is critical legal theory – like other (sub)fields – vulnerable to the effects of 
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disciplinary parochialism and imperialism.122 For instance, one of the major 
contributions of Douzinas – an academic rockstar among the British (or at 
any rate predominantly UK-based) tradition of critical legal theory – has been 
to posit and apply a difference between 'politics' and 'the political'.123 The 
former represents the formal sphere of government and administration, 
whereas the latter refers to the actual workings – and contestation – of power, 
ideology and material interests.124 This can be a useful heuristic. It is not, 
however, especially profound. 
Furthermore, in putting forward a narrow view of 'politics' in order to 
contrast this with 'the political' some of the problems of disciplinary 
imperialism are evident. For instance, few within the discipline of politics,125 
are likely to agree with a narrow definition of 'the politics of "political 
science"' as a 'conflation of political discourse with the routine political 
debates of the day, and around the machinations of parties, ministers and 
lobbyists', which turns 'social and economic conflict into a matter of 
accountancy, and ideology into calculated party manifestos'.126 Even though 
such an approach to 'political science' does exist, it is not necessarily 
 
122 Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary 
Studies' (n 16). 
123 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The political philosophy of 
cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 102-103. Douzinas is (co-)author and 
(co-)editor of several major books in critical legal studies, and is an editor of Law 
and Critique ('the prime international critical legal theory journal'). See Law and 
Critique, 'Description' <https://link.springer.com/journal/10978> accessed 25 
July 2019; Law and Critique, 'Editorial Board' <https://www.springer.com/ 
philosophy/philosophy+of+law/journal/10978?detailsPage=editorialBoard> 
accessed 25 July 2019. On the British critical legal tradition, see Douzinas and 
Gearey (n 18) 239-247. 
124 Douzinas (n 123) 102-103; Stone, Wall and Douzinas (n 20) 3-4. 
125 See, for example, Adrian Leftwich (ed), What is Politics? The Activity and its Study, 
Revised Edition (Polity Press 2004). 
126 Stone, Wall and Douzinas (n 20) 3. Koskenniemi, similarly, summarises his 
'critique of the political science enterprise' with a broad anecdote of 'countless 
PhD students' who 'complain about their being instructed to write on such 
abstractions as "liberalism", "realism", "constructivism" etc.' (alongside some 
more substantial evidence of the dominance of positivist approaches in 
international relations scholarship in the US academy). Koskenniemi (n 64) 399-
400, 411. 
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dominant, nor is it taken for granted by those disciplined as political 
scientists.127 
Several scholars used by critical legal theorists to build this argument could 
just as easily be categorised as part of the discipline of politics (at least in the 
subdiscipline of political theory) as they could within law or legal theory.128 
Something of a false dichotomy between disciplines appears to be evident.129 
Nor, one might suspect, is it especially likely that scholars acquainted with 
disciplinary work in areas such as politics or sociology would be bowled over 
by the revelation that power operates in and through institutions and 
processes (such as law) – and their study – which are presented as neutral or 
value-free.130 As an example of this position in critical legal theory, consider 
that the editors of a major collection note that 'if there is an overarching 
argument to the book, it is an argument for the renewal of our understanding 
of legality's complicity with politics and power'.131 That legality is complicit 
with politics and power is not a revelation. Having established this, the 
question then is how an understanding of this, its implications, and responses 
to it might be furthered – and what this might mean. If, like Koskenniemi, 
one identifies 'a gut feeling about the way the injustice of the world is a product 
 
127 Leftwich (n 125); on disciplining of scholars see Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary 
Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary Studies' (n 16). In Leftwich's volume, 
Leftwich (n 125), for example, a – potentially somewhat similar – distinction is 
made between 'the use of the word "politics", with a lowercase "p", refer[ing] to 
the actual activity out there in the world' and 'the word "Politics" (or Political 
Science), with an upper-case "P", refer[ing] to the academic discipline, that is to 
the study of political life'. See Adrian Leftwich, 'Preface'. In Adrian Leftwich (ed), 
What is Politics? The Activity and its Study, Revised Edition (Polity Press 2004) viii. 
128 Douzinas (n 123) 102-105; Stone, Wall and Douzinas (n 20) 3-4. 
129 On this trend in general see Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); 
Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary Studies' (n 16). 
130 Howard S Becker, 'Whose Side Are We On?' (1967) 14 Social Problems 239; Alvin 
W Gouldner, 'Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology' (1962) 9 
Social Problems 199; Cox (n 1); also Fischl (n 59) 802; Dudai (n 17). 
131 Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall and Costas Douzinas, 'Preface' in Matthew Stone, 
lllan rua Wall and Costas Douzinas (eds), New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the 
Political (Birkbeck Law Press 2012) ix. Likewise, see Koskenniemi's position that 
'it seems necessary to me to re-describe professionalism and the various expert 
languages as already political'. Koskenniemi (n 64) 404. 
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of its ruling symbolic order and therefore cannot be treated through it', what 
then is to be done about it?132 
Who and what is (critical legal) theory for in these instances? Partly it appears 
to be trying to show that critical legal theory as a subdiscipline is able to solve 
problems caused by law as a discipline (by criticising the idea that law is 
neutral in relation to politics and power), and by extension, to solve problems 
which might otherwise be approached from the perspective of other 
disciplines such as politics or sociology.133 Disciplinary divides in academia, 
and the influence this has outside academia, form part of the prevailing 
order.134 Critical legal theory does not often challenge this disciplinary order 
and can in fact reinforce it. Indeed, Douzinas and Adam Gearey argue that a 
key contribution of the 'Brit Crit' movement (which they largely treat as 
synonymous with the CLC) is to 'have reintroduced legal scholarship where it 
always belonged, at the heart of the academy'135 – so 'disciplinary imperialism', 
one might argue.136 David Jabbari, by contrast, reflecting the other side of the 
same coin, suggests that '[a]nalysing the impact of legal norms on other social 
systems is arguably the role of the sociologist'137 rather than the legal scholar 
– so 'disciplinary parochialism', then.138 
Who these instances of critical legal theorising are for, on the face of it, 
largely seems to be other legal scholars (and, possibly, practitioners). There is 
something to be said for this. Legal education and scholarship often focus 
upon a narrow set of methodologies and attendant theoretical assumptions, 
which it is valuable to interrogate and expand.139 Moreover, '[s]tudents of 
 
132 Koskenniemi (n 64) 411; also Roele (n 61); more broadly, see, for example, Dudai 
(n 17). 
133 See, for example, Jabbari (n 5). 
134 Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary 
Studies' (n 16); Miller (n 16); Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (n 12). 
135 Douzinas and Gearey (n 18) 240, emphasis added; see also Douzinas (n 75) vii. 
136 Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary 
Studies' (n 16). 
137 Jabbari (n 5) 538. 
138 Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For Postdisciplinary 
Studies' (n 16). 
139 Bal Sokhi-Bulley, 'Alternative Methodologies: Learning Critique as a Skill' (2013) 
3 Law and Method 6; McManus (n 18). 
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critical theorists often go on to become practitioners, constituting an 
important vector of influence' on '[e]volutions in practice'.140 However, 
encouraging law students, legal scholars and lawyers to think outside the 
dominant paradigms of their field141 is a far cry from 'challenging […] systemic 
injustice' as 'the companion and guide of radical change'.142 
Indeed, these issues are worth considering in relation to Douzinas having 
latterly been a member of Greece's Hellenic parliament, elected for Syriza – 
something of a collision between legal critique, 'politics' and 'the political' 
perhaps.143 There are plainly contradictions in Syriza as a self-declared anti-
austerity party of the left implementing deep cuts, privatisations and 
austerity measures.144 Syriza left government having failed to achieve radical 
change or challenge systemic injustice (some might argue they did not even 
try to achieve this) and having reinforced the prevailing neoliberal order, 
including the domination of Greece by the interests of the European 
Commission-European Central Bank-International Monetary Fund 
'troika'.145 Critical theorists' participation in government was clearly not 
enough to successfully 'challeng[e] […] orthodoxy, ideology and systemic 
injustice' or provide 'the companion and guide of radical change'.146  
Douzinas, of course, cannot be singled out as to blame for Syriza's failings. 
Nevertheless, the special appeal of various strands of critical theory to 
academics,147 and the emphasis placed by Douzinas and others on placing 
 
140 Sharp (n 12) 575. 
141 Sokhi-Bulley (n 139). 
142 Critical Legal Thinking (n 5); see also Roele (n 61). 
143 Douzinas reflects on this experience as an 'accidental politician' in a recent book, 
Costas Douzinas, Syriza in Power: Reflections of an Accidental Politician (Polity Press 
2017). 
144 See Richard Seymour, 'Syriza: the denouement' (7 July 2019) 
<https://www.patreon.com/posts/syriza-28201028> accessed 26 July 2019; David 
Adler, 'The three mistakes behind Syriza's demise in Greece' The Guardian (8 July 
2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/08/syriza-demise-
greece-alexis-tsipras?CMP=share_btn_tw> accessed 26 July 2019; also Robert 
Knox, 'Against Law-sterity' Salvage (13 December 2018) <https://salvage.zone/in-
print/against-law-sterity/> accessed 12 June 2020. 
145 Seymour (n 144); Adler (n 144). 
146 Critical Legal Thinking (n 5). 
147 Riley (n 19); Thompson (n 7). 
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legal critique 'at the heart of the academy' comes to mind.148 Outside the 
academy, does such theory do what it claims? Perhaps not, at least in this 
case.149 
Critical theory can also be deeply exclusionary.150 Critical legal theory – much 
like other (sub)fields151 – is dominated by a relatively small group of people (in 
large part, but not exclusively, made up of white men). Like other (sub)fields 
– and subcultures and political movements – critical legal theory includes 
some by excluding others.152 Critique 'polices' and critical legal theorists 
engage in policing through both prescription and prohibition.153 Knowledge 
of – and, at worst, conformity with – a particular canon of authors and 
approaches can be used as a gatekeeping device, so that in-groups and out-
groups are demarcated by their familiarity with critical theory's terms of art 
and neologisms.154 For example, an interlocutor responding to Elden's 
position on criticism of Foucault (and whether or not Foucault was 
sympathetic to neoliberalism),155 raised the potential for critical theory to be 
dominated by small, exclusive, groups of 'experts'. They wondered, for 
instance, 
 
148 Douzinas and Gearey (n 18) 240; Douzinas (n 75) vii. 
149 See also Langlois (n 13) for a discussion of Douzinas's theoretical positions in 
relation to an actually existing politics of austerity. More broadly, this is worth 
considering in light of austerity as 'a deeply juridical phenomenon', framed – 
including in Greece – as a (fixed) legal rather than 'political' (and therefore 
contestable) issue; see Knox (n 144). 
150 Caroline Ramazanoğlu, 'Introduction' in Caroline Ramazanoğlu (ed), Up against 
Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism, 1-25 
(Routledge 1993) 1; Bordo (n 23) 179. 
151 See, for example, Davidovic (n 119). 
152 See Phil Burton-Cartledge, 'Stanning for Corbyn, and Other Twitter Tribes' (All 
That Is Solid…, 5 August 2019) <http://averypublicsociologist.blogspot.com/ 
2019/08/stanning-for-corbyn-and-other-twitter.html> accessed 8 August 2019; 
Roele (n 61) 705-706; John Henry Schlegel, 'CLS Wasn't Killed by a Question' 
(2007) 58 Alabama Law Review 967, 975. 
153 Roele (n 61) 705-706. 
154 Douzinas and Gearey (n 18) 247; Schlegel (n 152); Bordo (n 23) 179; also Thompson 
(n 7); Latour (n 6). 
155 Elden (n 40). 
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must we all become historians of French labor politics in the 1960s and 70s 
in order to understand Foucault? Must the tens of thousands of 
Anglo/American scholars in the humanities and social sciences who regularly 
cite Foucault become experts in post-war French political history in order to 
proceed with citing him?156 
Furthermore, having participated in the CLC, experience suggests that 
despite its professed egalitarian, anarchist, horizontal organisational 
structure, the conference may be as pervaded by cliques and unequal 
(including gendered and heterosexist) power dynamics as other clubs and 
organisations, including those professing an egalitarian ethos.157 This is not to 
say that critical (legal) theorists are necessarily unaware of these tensions and 
contradictions, though some may well be.158 Nor is it to suggest that critical 
legal theory is worse than more mainstream currents in terms of reinforcing 
the prevailing order. Indeed, some other currents reinforce the prevailing 
order on purpose.159 However, it is all the more necessary to respond to these 
tendencies given the overt purposes of critical theory. 
There is something to be said for considering critical (legal) theory in light of 
Alexis Papadopolis's critique of certain manifestations of antifascism as 
'group identity' – 'not what you do, but what you are'.160 Papadopolis focuses 
on particular antifascist responses to regular mobilisations by the far-right 
Proud Boys in Portland, Oregon, USA – a city where 'probably more than 
 
156 Progressive Geographies, Comment on 'Foucault and Neoliberalism – A Few 
Thoughts in Response to the Zamora Piece in Jacobin' by Stuart Elden, posted by 
the user wobblywheel at 6:01pm (Progressive Geographies, 4 January 2015) 
<https://progressivegeographies.com/2014/12/17/foucault-and-neoliberalism-a-
few-thoughts-in-response-to-the-zamora-piece-in-jacobin/#comment-73036> 
accessed 17 June 2019. 
157 See, for example, Lara Montesinos Coleman and Serena A Bassi, 'Deconstructing 
Militant Manhood: Masculinities in the Disciplining of (Anti-)Globalization 
Politics' (2011) 13 International Feminist Journal of Politics 204; Ramazanoğlu (n 
149) 1; also Davidovic (n 119); on the CLC, see Douzinas and Gearey (n 18) 239-247. 
158 Douzinas and Gearey (n 18) 247; Douzinas, Goodrich and Hachamovitch (n 18) 13-
14; also Fischl (n 59); Schlegel (n 152). 
159 For discussion of this see, for example, Fischl (n 59). 
160 Alexis Papadopolis, 'Masochistic Milkshake Martyrs' Damage (28 October 2019) 
<https://damagemag.com/2019/10/28/masochistic-milkshake-martyrs/> accessed 
6 November 2019. Alexis Papadopolis is presumably a pseudonym. 
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anywhere else in the country, any street activity by polo-shirted chauvinists is 
guaranteed to be met with an energetic and hostile response'.161 Papadopolis 
argues that a mutual (sadomasochistic) relationship is formed between 
fascism and antifascism of this sort. Each needs the other so that group 
identity can be defined and maintained in opposition to – but also, in a sense, 
in complicity with – the other: 
If antifascism is a group identity, then who wants to actually get rid of the 
fascists that buttress it? If antifascism is pleasure, then why submit it to the 
political needs of the situation? The sadist doesn't want to transform society; 
she wants perpetual motion: the fist colliding with Richard Spencer's face, 
repeating in time with the music, on an eternal loop.162 
Something similar might be said of uncritical critical theorists. Such critics 
need the mainstream, the conservative, liberal and neoliberal to continue to 
exist so that group identity can be maintained as being critics – or even being 
'crits'163 – not doing criticism.  
Papadopolis notes, echoing some of the criticism of critical legal theory 
outlined above – the sort rejected by Fischl164 – that 
[i]t's been well-argued that the left needs to get out of the habit of simply 
opposing the evils of the world — of merely defining itself as anti-racist, anti-
capitalist, antifascist, etc — and start putting forward a positively articulated 
vision of what we support.165 
However, the kind of relationship Papadopolis describes 'isn't even 
oppositionalism; at its worst, it's a kind of complicity'.166 Papadopolis argues 
that '[i]f you do genuinely oppose something, first of all you have to refuse to 
adopt the role it prescribes for you'.167 What might this mean in practice? For 
the antifascists Papadopolis discusses, the answer may be relatively 
straightforward (even if summed up in the format of a joke): 'A masochist 
 
161 Ibid.  
162 Ibid.  
163 Fischl (n 59). Douzinas and Gearey (n 18). 
164 Fischl (n 59). 
165 Papadopolis (n 160).  
166 Ibid.  
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says, hit me. A sadist answers, no'.168 For critical theorists, and those 
deploying critical theory, consideration must be given to what role they have 
been prescribed and how it might be refused. Lest it be forgotten, (critical 
legal) theorists and users of theory in the academy 'are involved in the 
reproduction of capital, regardless of the content of their lectures' – or 
publications.169 This leads to the question of what they can do to refuse their 
prescribed roles or otherwise avoid the pitfalls these present. 
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
How can bullshit be avoided and uncritical critique made to be critical? Can 
the pitfall of 'critique of critique' (of critique of critique) ad infinitum be 
avoided?170 There are no easy answers – that is rather the point. Nevertheless, 
some possibilities are set out here. One possibility is abandoning – or at least 
weakening attachments to – divisions in scholarly disciplines.171 This is set out 
next. After this, the related possibility of weakening divides between theory 
and practice is put forward,172 followed by closing remarks on the key themes 
and implications of the article. 
A move towards postdisciplinarity could militate against the problems of 
uncritical critical theory. If the study and theorisation of phenomena such as 
law and politics are not considered to be fundamentally separate activities 
 
168 Ibid. This is not to suggest that fascism ought never to be physically confronted 
but rather to emphasise the need for reflection upon all tactics and strategies, and 
their effects. Such reflection must be on practices rather than on identities – it is 
the focus on identity, rather than on action and effect, which results in perverse 
complicity between antifascism (as identity) and fascism in the instances 
discussed by Papadopolis. See Stanislav Vysotsky, 'The Influence of Threat on 
Tactical Choices of Militant Anti-fascist Activists' (2013) 5 Interface 263; M 
Testa, '"A Good Deal of Disorder" or The Anarchists & Anti-Fascism In The 
UK' (2017) 25 Anarchist Studies 9; Charlotte Nichols, 'No Quarter for Fascists' 
Tribune (2 January 2020) <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/01/no-quarter-for-
fascists> accessed 6 January 2020. 
169 Noterman and Pusey (n 119) 178; Evans (n 119); see also Suárez-Krabbe (n 118). 
170 Douzinas (n 105); Dudai (n 17). 
171 Miller (n 16); Sayer, 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies!' (n 16); Sayer, 'For 
Postdisciplinary Studies' (n 16); Rosenberg (n 16). 
172 See, for example, Sharp (n 12); Dudai (n 17). 
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then the importation of banalities packaged as insight from one discipline to 
another becomes less likely.173 Concurrently – and intertwined with this – 
genuine insights of critical critique become more likely. Thinking beyond 
established disciplines encourages the development and use of tools 
appropriate to addressing matters of interest rather than the application of 
disciplinary tools to a narrower set of appropriate – or, worse, inappropriate 
– questions.174 In practice, '[t]his would mean pursuing ideas without regard 
for the established borders of disciplines' and 'moving away from the idea that 
studies ought to have a home discipline in law or another discipline (even if 
the boundaries of this home are permeated by interdisciplinarity)'.175 Indeed, 
one way in which postdisciplinarity can add value is by bringing greater 
coherence to areas of study precisely because conforming to disciplinary 
boundaries (even if they are stretched by interdisciplinarity) leads to the 
arbitrary division of phenomena into component elements which are then 
approached from particular disciplinary perspectives rather than 
holistically.176 
This expands the toolbox available to scholars and can thus contribute to 
'clarify[ing the] range of possible alternatives' to the prevailing social and 
political order, in line with Cox's notion of critical theory's 'principle 
objective'.177 This also, at least potentially, has the effect of rupturing the 
implicit hierarchies inherent in the placement of each discipline's critical 
 
173 Fischl (n 59) 802; Darren J. O'Byrne, 'Marxism and Human Rights: New 
Thoughts on an Old Debate' (2019) 23 International Journal of Human Rights 
638. 
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theorists in a privileged position, uniquely able to see through the naïveté of 
the non-critical 'great unwashed'.178 
Another, related, possibility is weakening the divide between theory and 
practice, not simply by asserting that they are the same thing, but by 
consistently engaging in the dialectical interrogation of each by the other.179 
The questions drawn from Cox form part of this: who and what is any given 
instance of theorisation for?180 What does it mean for practice? Likewise, 
who and what is any given instance of practice for? What does it mean for 
theory? Practice here can be understood broadly, encompassing, for example, 
the professional activities of lawyers and scholars, as well as institutional and 
non-institutional forms of political activism.181 
If critical theory is to be 'the companion and guide of radical change'182 then 
it must 'clarify [the] range of possible alternatives'.183 The point is not only to 
understand the world, but also to change it.184 Therefore, utopianism will not 
do: 
if critical theory is to constrain its potential utopianism, as Cox argues it 
must, then an analysis of tactical and strategic policy questions associated 
with 'real world' implementation – and at higher level of detail than is typical 
of most critical studies literature – is required.185 
Utopianism should not, however, be confused with radicalism.186 If radical 
change is to actually occur with critical theory as its 'companion and guide',187 
 
178 Latour (n 6) 239; see also Sharp (n 12), especially his summary of Frankfurt School 
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186 Frederick Engels, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'. In Karl Marx and Frederick 
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then those whose critique exposes the contradictions and the utopianism of, 
for example, mainstream and liberal approaches to law ought not to 'offer a 
utopian fantasy of [their] own'.188 Utopias offer little in the way of guidance. 
However, 'relentless critique',189 pointedly refusing to answer the 'what 
would you put in its place?' question,190 also offers little guidance.191 Some 
critical (legal) theorists might suggest that this is beside the point – that their 
aim is not to provide a guide for change.192 Very well – this is perhaps where 
thinking 'against' and 'beyond' critical legal theory comes to the forefront 
rather than solely thinking 'in' it,193 though plainly some critical legal theorists 
do intend their work to guide radical change.194 One might draw a comparison 
with Papadopolis's challenge to Portland's antifascists to refuse to adopt the 
role prescribed for them by conditions to which they claim to be opposed.195 
Whether in, against, or beyond critical legal theory, for those who are 
committed to pursuing radical change, there is an imperative to think 
through how this might be achieved. Likewise, there is an imperative to think 
through how they might actually refuse complicity with the conditions they 
oppose. 
Dustin Sharp's development of a Coxian approach to critical theory could be 
useful here.196 Sharp suggests that problem-solving – status quo-accepting – 
and critical – status quo-disrupting – theories should not be treated as a 
simple binary.197 Rather, the degree to which the status quo is reinforced or 
disrupted exists on a spectrum or 'continuum of critique'.198 Sharp advocates 
'integrated critique', bringing critical theory together 'in sustained and close 
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conversation' with 'critically motivated problem-solving theory'.199 In Sharp's 
conception 'critically motivated problem-solving' differs from Cox's 
problem-solving theory200 because it makes no claims to value neutrality.201 
Moreover, 'unlike most critical theory', it 'is keyed to understanding "the 
how" of bringing about the potential alternative orders for which critical 
theory has provided a very rough sketch. In other words, it sweats some of 
the small stuff that critical theory famously ignores'.202 Sharp's 'critically 
motivated problem-solving theory' then 'corkscrews around the continuum 
of critique […] helping to push things in one direction or another' – towards 
status quo-acceptance or disruption.203 This kind of approach might be most 
obviously useful in areas such as human rights and transitional justice (Sharp's 
field), where 'the transmission of ideas from the academy to practice may be 
especially significant given the frequent migration of "pracademics" between 
the two worlds'.204 It could, however, be applied more broadly in an attempt 
to resolve the kinds of tensions this article has identified. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A fundamental theme of the discussion in this article is that critical theorists 
and those making use of critical theory should consistently interrogate what 
it is they are doing and why they are doing it, as well as what the effects of 
what they are doing are. They should look at themselves in the mirror – but 
more than that, they should ensure that they have stepped out of the 
distorting hall of mirrors which is made up of both mainstream approaches 
and uncritical critique.205 Having done this, they should ask themselves what 
they are doing, why they are doing it, who they are doing it for and what the 
implications are. These questions ought to haunt the producers and users of 
critical (legal) theory, and should return again and again to interrogate critical 
inquiry. If, on reflection, there are no clear answers to these questions – or if 
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the answers are bullshit206 – then an opportunity presents itself to think and 
act differently: to engage in more critical critique, or to move away from, or 
perhaps beyond, critical theory altogether. This, then, is the self-directed and 
outward-facing challenge laid down by the article, and the goal set by it. 
 
206 Frankfurt, On Bullshit (n 8). 
